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Una prospettiva pedagogica [Using Gramsci. A Pedagogical Perspective] (Roma, Carocci). It looks at
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Using Gramsci. A pedagogic perspective
Manuela Ausilio
1. Introduction
How, as educationalists, should we read Gramsci today? This is
the stance adopted by Massimo Balducci to call the attention of
scholars, in particular educationalists and pedagogues, to the
actuality of Gramsci’s thought on the question of the formation of
the human subject. His volume Oltre la subalternità. Praxis e educazione
in Gramsci [Beyond Subalternity. Praxis and Education in Gramsci]1 aims
at a “new pedagogic reading of Gramsci’s thought” (p. 8) following
the question he poses of what is the meaning of thinking out in a
“Gramscian” way the pedagogic bases of our times? To what use
can we today put his educational theory?
The persistent lack of attention of contemporary pedagogy vis-àvis Gramsci’s thought does indeed remain an open question. This
substantial silence seems to be predominantly the result of the way
in which Gramsci’s thought was for long interpreted, following on
the complex interweaving of his political and intellectual biography,
of Italian history and of the editions of his writings: All these factors have conditioned the reception even of his pedagogical thought
– as regards that part of his life which he was able to determine for
himself, Gramsci was, as we know, a militant intellectual, journalist,
and founder and leader of the Communist Party of Italy. Taking
into account the involvement of the scientific community, which
beginning from the mid-1970s has had at its disposal the critical
edition of Gramsci’s prison writings, it now seems the right time to
ask once more not only “what he really said” but also and above all
“what he can still say to us” (p. 8). Assuming without further ado
the point of view of the practical utility of Gramsci’s thought,
Baldacci’s reconsideration takes as a privileged standpoint that of
theoretical-dialectical pedagogy. In the current situation of the
“politico-cultural hegemony of neoliberalism” the need to
“supersede the new forms of cultural and mental subalternity linked
to this” (pp. 9-10) is ever stronger and Gramsci here can be of use.
1
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2. Education, antithesis and conformism: the quest for pedagogical unity
The book is divided into a number of densely written chapters:
Reading Gramsci as Pedagogues; Gramsci’s Interpretations of Pedagogy;
Rethinking Gramsci, Using Gramsci. The book is mainly centred on the
analysis of the prison Notebooks with few and brief comments being
devoted to the pre-prison writings and the letters. After a close
examination of the more important interpretations of Gramscian
pedagogy of the last century (Urbani, Broccoli, Manacorda) and a
critical run-down of a number of conceptual nodes of educational
theory, Baldacci argues that Gramsci’s “pedagogy” cannot be taken
in isolation from the Notebooks in their entirety and from his work,
but “constitute a perspective” from the inside (p. 7). This pedagogy is
not then to be understood as the nth “sector” of his thought, but
represents precisely – this is the book’s basic argument – “an
internal side of the philosophy of praxis” or “this whole philosophy
conceived from the perspective of this pedagogical side” (p. 9).
Baldacci proposes a broad conception of Gramsci’s pedagogy, not
limited to the school, but projected within the horizon of the whole
of society and within the perspective of permanent training, and of
a dual-nature process: 1) education as an antithesis, in other words
as a struggle against the dominant common sense for the construction of a “higher culture” and a “new mentality”; 2) education
as a new conformism, as a process appropriate to making man
precisely “conformant to a given conception of the world and, in a
strong sense, to a given organization of production” (p. 250). Of
these two inseparable sides, Baldacci’s intention is to privilege the
former, the one in which education and politics coincide in the optic
of the “formation of a new subjectivity, able to supersede the
subaltern mentality in order to don the clothes of the leaders”
(ibid.). To educate in a Gramscian sense means, then, in essence to
set in motion a pedagogical-cultural struggle that allows one to go
beyond subalternity.
3. The pedagogical challenge: how escape from the “primitive philosophy of
common sense”
“Our work starts off from a different assumption, which develops one of Broccoli’s arguments. Our attempt represents the identification of Gramsci’s pedagogic thought with one side of the
philosophy praxis – Baldacci argues – the ‘critical’ side” or “this
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entire philosophy seen from the perspective of that side. This
approach does not suppress the importance of the categories of
hegemony (emphasized by Urbani and Broccoli) conformism (Manacorda) or historical bloc (Broccoli) but leads to contextualizing these categories within the perspective of the philosophy of praxis” (p. 175).
Baldacci acknowledges a great merit in Gramsci: his honesty in
recognizing “the ambiguity of the educational relationship” which
in its “concrete historical form” includes both a persuasive aspect and
a coercive aspect (p. 85). The educational relationship is “the first
hegemonic relationship (and therefore one of power) that human
beings experiences in their social existence” (p. 86). It is not intrinsically emancipatory: in so far as it is a “molecular translation of the
hegemonic relationship, it shares the power structure with this
latter” (p. 87) and can therefore become “as much a device of
subjection (…) as a factor of emancipation (p. 87). The coercionconsent relationship may be directed towards the emancipation of
the subalterns or to the maintenance of their subaltern status. And
here a third element and criterion intervenes, which is the
conception of the world represented by the philosophy of praxis, a
philosophy which “does not does not tend to leave the ‘simple’ in
their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead
them to a higher conception of life”.2 In this sense the “hegemonicpedagogical process has an emancipatory capacity only if it is united
to an authentic will for the liberation of the subject” (p. 88). The
connection between pedagogy and Gramscian philosophy runs
deep: “pedagogy must be seen from the viewpoint of the
transformatory praxis of existing mentalities, aimed at intellectual
and moral reform”, and as such represents the critical side of the
philosophy of praxis at the formative level (p. 176).
4. Gramsci as pedagogue, a discontinuous interest: Urban, Broccoli and
Manacorda
The question regarding the pedagogical use of Gramsci’s thought
begins from the interest in testing its practical validity at the present
time, the reason for which Baldacci introduces first of all a number
of methodological questions regarding the interpretations of the
2 A. Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, ed. V. Gerratana (hereafter QdC), Torino: Einaudi 1975,
Q11§12, p. 1384. In English Selections from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter SPN), ed. and tr. Q.
Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart 1971, p. 332.
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Prison Notebooks aimed at clarifying the impossibility of an
“innocent” reading of Gramsci, and the presuppositions that guide
his own interpretation, as in the case of any interpretation. These
guidelines are the elaboration of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis as
an original conception, here called critical Marxism; the relational
and dialectical construction of the concepts; and the influence of
the political nature of Gramsci’s interpretations on the way of
reading their pedagogy.
After rapidly going over later publications, such as those of
Orsomarso, Maltese and others, and pausing in particular over the
interpretation given by Dario Ragazzini in his Società industriale e
formazione umana (1976), Baldacci’s volume concentrates on just a
few publications, but those “of prime importance”, which have
become a reference point for pedagogical studies on Gramsci,
namely the readings given by Urbani, Broccoli and Manacorda. It
singles out a number of key concepts (or conceptual relations)
characterizing these works and subjects them to a critical
examination. These concepts range from the historically polysemic
one of hegemony (an in-depth analysis that includes its aspects of
hegemonic apparatus and ideology) through to those of historical bloc,
conformism (in its dynamic and its creative aspects), and most of all the
philosophy of praxis. We are here dealing with interpretations that lie
in two sub-periods (1964-75, and 1956-64) of that phase of the
interpretation of Gramsci that Baldacci calls post-Togliattian (19641989) – differentiating it from the preceding Togliattian phase
(1944-1964) and the successive post-communist one (after 1989)
characterized by the so-called “Fordist factory” and by specific
forms of the conflict between capital and labour.
Baldacci underlines a number of problematic aspects of all three
interpretations. Giovanni Urbani, who (like Broccoli but different
from Manacorda) was unable to consult the critical edition of the
Prison Notebooks, centred his analysis mainly on the education-hegemony
relation.3 He argued that in Gramsci the historical and formative
processes are superposed and that there is an exemplary analogy
between the educational relationship and the hegemonic one, both
understood as progressive processes, with reference to Gramsci’s
postulate: “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an
3 Cf. the Introduction to Antonio Gramsci, La formazione dell’uomo: scritti di pedagogia, ed. Giovanni
Urbani, Roma: Editori Riuniti 1967.
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educational relationship”.4 Baldacci however makes the objection
that the meaning of the hegemonic relationship as always a
progressive equilibrium – in so far as it is formative – does not
correspond to the concept of hegemony in Gramsci. Understood in
its broad meaning, as the unity of leadership-domination, force and
consent, the hegemonic relationship reveals an asymmetry between
leaders-led, rulers-ruled that may imply different solutions. There
are the educators/politicians who “would like to confine men for
ever to the cradle”5 and those who see in the moment of force only
a transitional point of the educational process. In the second case
we are dealing with the “dynamic educational relationship”, the
only one aimed at emancipation from the position of being
subaltern. The risk Urbani runs, instead, is that of sliding into a
culturalist vision of human formation by arguing that we are dealing
only with making uniform the deformed degree of “critical
awareness” or “cultural level” between the two groups.
Mario Alighieri Manacorda’s Il principio educativo in Gramsci.
Americanismo e conformismo6 deals with the subject of formation in
Gramsci in a non-sectoralized perspective, commenting analytically
on the passages of pedagogic interest in his writings in connection
with the theoretical motif of Americanism, located at the base of the
educational principle. Additionally it puts at the centre the category
of conformism in contrast to that of educational spontaneity. In
Baldacci’s view Manacorda “provides us with an organic and
coherent interpretation of Gramsci’s pedagogical thought, destined
to become the mainstream interpretation” (p. 114). The “pedagogical” passages, however, do not seem sufficiently well-inserted
in the overall context of Gramsci’s thought. The hypothesis of a
cypher by which Gramsci speaks of Americanism since he cannot
speak of the Soviet Union is assumed uncritically. But, above all,
putting the category of educational conformism at the centre would
end up with an excessive accentuation of the component of
“discipline” in the formative process, with the risk of presenting
Gramsci’s pedagogy as a sort of “pedagogical economism” in which
the form of education is coercive and its content determined by
QdC, cit., Q10II§44, p. 1331. In English, SPN, cit., p. 350.
QdC, cit., Q11§1, p. 1366. In English Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (hereafter
FSPN), ed. and tr. D. Boothman, London: Lawrence and Wishart 1995, cit., p. 158.
6 Mario Alighieri Manacorda, Il principio educativo in Gramsci. Americanismo e conformismo, Roma:
Armando 1970.
4
5
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industrial production. Even when Manacorda underlines the
importance that the subaltern strata (ceti), in wanting to be their
own leaders, should assume the perspective of a proposed conformism
(by which one reaches a collective belonging together through a
“stage comprising the development of individuality and critical
personality”7 rejecting an imposed conformism of an authoritarian and
regressive type), he does not take the argument to its extreme
conclusion. The concept of proposed conformism is understood
only if it is inserted within the “framework of the philosophy of praxis,
within which the emancipation of the subalterns assumes priority”
as the end of the division between leaders and subalterns: “selfdiscipline means becoming leaders of oneselves (p. 119).
The interpretation that, in Baldacci’s opinion, is the richest and
most articulated in terms of educational topics is that of Angelo
Broccoli. In his Antonio Gramsci e l’educazione come egemonia8 the
education-hegemony relation again assumes a central position, but
with a dynamic conception being attached to both. If hegemony – while
being understood essentially from the cultural side as the
intellectual-mass dialectic – changes in time, tending to develop
“ever more advanced forms of aware participation”, then it follows
that this dynamic feature influences the pedagogic relationship. This
relationship, understood as the master-pupil relation between two
historical blocs, is modified together with the progressive retreat of
the folklore element and is therefore configured in “active,
reciprocal, dynamic, relational” terms. In addition, in Baldacci’s view,
Broccoli gives full value to the conformism-historical bloc connection
(arguing that the educational conformation changes in time
alongside the hegemonic relationship) and to creative conformism as a
process not only of “adaptation to the historical process” but also
adaptation “of the historical process through a collective effort, in
which all participate in their own original way” (p. 137). Indeed, the
historical bloc is a “processual unity between the action of material
social forces and the active reaction constituted by their ideological
elaboration” (p. 143). However, as Baldacci argues, creativity for
Gramsci is to be understood in the framework of the philosophy of
praxis, in so far as it expresses the possibility of transforming reality
as the transformation of common sense, as the way of “feeling”
7
8

QdC, cit., Q9§23, p. 1111; in English FSPN, cit., p. 270.
A. Broccoli. Antonio Gramsci e l’educazione come egemonia, Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1972.
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and “thinking” of the masses, as the diffusion of a “new conception
able to put itself forward as a principle of action” (p. 146), as an
“active norm of conduct”.9 In his successive work (Ideologia e
educazione, 1974) Broccoli values this connection to the full, identifying in the philosophy of praxis the “central motif that animates
Gramsci’s pedagogical thought”, a “fundamental point for a new
interpretation (and a new use) of his pedagogical thought” (p. 147).
5. Only the philosophy of praxis is directed to the emancipation of the subalterns
Tracing his way through Gramsci’s three series of Notes on
Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism (May 1930-May 1932), Baldacci’s
intention is to reconstruct the “diachronic pathway of the
philosophy of praxis and of pedagogy” (p. 181). Gramsci’s
formulation of the relationship science-common sense makes the
basic pedagogic theme of intellectual and moral reform emerge as the
“the mind’s revolutionary dialectic”, a struggle against folklore to create a
“new mental order (a higher type of thought)” (p. 180). Baldacci
identifies in Q8§220 (March 1932) the place in the text where we
first find the emergence of the “intrinsic pedagogical side of the philosophy
of praxis”:
A philosophy of praxis must initially adopt a polemical stance, as
superseding the existing mode of thinking. It must therefore present itself as a
critique of “common sense” (but only after it has based itself on common
sense in order to know show that “everyone” is a philosopher and that the
point is not to introduce a totally new form of knowledge into “everyone’s”
individual life, but to revitalize an already existing activity and make it critical).
It must also present itself as a critique of the intellectuals, put of which the
history of the intellectuals arises.10

Here however we have to state a certain perplexity of ours
regarding the interpretation. The author goes on to say:
The philosophy of praxis, then, does not present itself in a polemical
attitude only towards the philosophy of the intellectuals, which is also one of
the tasks of formation. This task consists in criticizing common sense in order
to promote the supersession of a widespread mode of thinking, thereby
effecting an intellectual and moral reform (pp. 180-81).
Gramsci Q11§59, p. 1485. In English SPN, op. cit., p. 346.
Q8§220, p. 1080. In English, Prison Notebooks (hereafter PN), Vol. 3, trans. J. A. Buttigieg,
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 369.
9

10
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Baldacci diversifies what Gramsci keeps together: the critique of
the intellectuals and the critique of common sense both belong to
“the existing mode of thinking” and are both therefore the object
of the “polemical” attitude of the philosophy of praxis. It does not
seem by chance that Gramsci goes out of his way to emphasize that
this philosophy is based on common sense. Baldacci seems to consider the “formative task” (a critical-polemical one), instead, essentially in the critique of common sense as the “struggle against a lower
form of culture for an advanced culture” (pp. 180-81). He seems to
exclude the hypothesis that the “subaltern mentality” condition may
also involve the intellectuals and their “philosophy”: but is this
really the case? Perhaps in order to avoid risks of being misunderstood, the author comments on the famous note from Notebook 4
(Q4§33) (Passage from Knowing to Understanding to Feeling and viceversa from Feeling to Understanding to Knowing)11 arguing that:
to effectively struggle against common sense one has to understand it (and
thus to feel through it), since only then can one understand how to link
dialectically that common feeling and understanding to knowing,

using Gramsci’s criterion of living philology to understand “what
type of conformism” the scholar “has internalized” (p. 190).
However, in our view a “democratic pedagogy” – far from
secondary as compared with the way in which the educator relates
to the common sense of the person being educated (and the
philosophy of the intellectual to the philosophy of comment sense)
– is a still-open question requiring further investigation.
6. From subalterns to leaders
From the pedagogical stance the basic problem of the Notebooks
is, in Baldacci’s view, to establish in what conditions it is possible for the
subaltern subjects to acquire a mentality of leaders. First of all, the condition of subalternity does not coincide with that of oppression

In English, PN Vol. 2, cit., 1996, p. 173. In agreement with the translation strategy used by
Hoare and Nowell-Smith for the second draft “C” text (SPN, op. cit., p. 418: Q12§13, p. 1396),
Buttigieg here renders the single word “sentire” in two senses (“understanding” and “feeling”); elsewhere in the words quoted (the first draft “A” text), for the verbs capire and, in this
context, comprendere, there is no ambiguity and they both are translated “understand”. [Tr. note.]
11
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indicated by Freire in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed.12 Oppression is a
state of “coercion and potential violence”, of “harassment and
perfidy”, in the face of which we are essentially impotent: subalternity is instead “dependence and subjection, often accompanied
by subordinate consent” (p. 257). Gramsci’s pedagogy of the subalterns
(p. 258) would before all put at the centre the “struggle against
common sense for the transformation of mentality” (p. 253).
Baldacci’s argument has current conditions as its background:
how in the real situation of today is this struggle to be carried out,
taking account of the new forms of subalternity conveyed by the
economic-ideological paradigm of “neoliberalism”? Today’s
hegemonic processes present the specific profile according to
which “the hegemonic side prevails over that of coercion” (p. 256).
The huge concentration of hegemony-consent is expressed in the
tendency, towards “single-thought forms” as a form of hegemony,
which “incorporates a ‘pedagogic’ project of the transformation of
man” and of the “formation of a new type of person”.13 Gramsci’s
pedagogy of the subalterns is important and useful in so far as it knows
how to “pose the question of emancipation not only in a ‘negative’
form” but in the constructive terms of a “transformation of the
subaltern mentality into the mentality of leaders, and thence of the
positive freedom of thinking by oneself and playing an active role in
taking collective decisions” (p. 258). The formation of a “new type
of producer” must then proceed hand in hand with the “supersession of cultural subalternity, with the conquest of the mentality
of leaders, in order to take an active part in the course of history,
instead of undergoing this fatalistically” (p. 256).
7. Every social forest finds nutrition in its roots
The author assumes the hypothesis of the modified current
scenario, that of a “post-Fordist” economy in which “social conflict
has been fragmented on many fronts, and in which left culture has
changed form and lost vitality, yielding to the hegemony of neoliberalism” (p. 156). Pedagogy too finds itself faced with new chalP. Freire, Pedagogia do Oprimido, Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1968; and subsequent editions
Porto: Edições Afrontamento. In English Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. M. Ramos, New York,
Herder and Herder, 1970 and, for recent editions, New York: Continuum.
13 [In Gramsci’s “C” texts, the phrase in English is used as here in Q15§74, p. 1833 (FSPN, op.
cit., p. 274: “Freud and the Collective Man”) and as “a new type of man” in Q22§2, p. 2146
(SPN, op. cit., p. 286 - tr. note).]
12
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lenges and is seeking new solutions, and without doubt the book
attains the objective of calling attention to the pedagogic thought of
Gramsci, an important author in so far as he puts in a central
position the need to supersede new forms of mental-cultural
subalternity. We said earlier: between the two sides of Gramscian
pedagogy (education as antithesis/critique of common sense and education
as a new conformism), Baldacci inclines towards the vitality above all
of the former. But we should also say: in concrete terms, is it really
possible to educate by exercising only the critique of a given common sense without in some way attempting, together with that, to
foster the birth or maintenance of a certain social order and order
of values (more or less knowingly conformant to a determinate
mode of production)? If one does not also assume the responsibility
for the thesis (remaining here within the metaphor of the dialectic) –
in other words favouring the diffusion of a system of reference
beliefs, principles and values, such as communism was for Gramsci
– is educational action still possible? In effect, Baldacci seems to see
this system of values in the construction of a “left” culture, putting
at the centre the “emancipation from subalternity” as the “pivoting
point of the democratic perspective” (p. 262). The volume deals
with the “democracy-education” link to the extent that the “emancipation from cultural subalternity” coincides with the “emancipation
of the intelligence”, with the development of the capacity to think:
“only education can go beyond subalternity”, since it allows the
formation of “mental habits that are critical towards the dominant
common sense”, which favour the supersession of the “division
between a formation for leading groups and one directed at the
subalterns” (loc. cit.). The author’s final appeal is to accept an “open
challenge” but a problematic one: that of not “renouncing liberaldemocratic ideology” but “deepening and extending it in the
direction of a radical and plural democracy” (loc. cit.). On the return
to radicality (where we include the etymological sense of “rootedness”),
one cannot but agree, bearing in mind however that every small
plant, every tree, group of trees or social forest has roots of its own.
These cannot be torn up in the name of the need for an abstract
“democratic” clean-up, since the terrain in which they sink their
roots is their condition for the survival of the living organism itself
in all its complexity. “Beyond whose subalternityi?” perhaps remains an
open question, on which it is worthwhile continuing to reflect.
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